Cheat Sheet to the Weeds in the NHTSA Guidelines

President Barack Obama did not go to the New York Times or the Washington Post. He went to the Pittsburgh-Post Gazette with an op-ed to push his support for driverless vehicles. 

Right now, too many people die on our roads – 35,200 last year alone – with 94 percent of those the result of human error or choice. Automated vehicles have the potential to save tens of thousands of lives each year. And right now, for too many senior citizens and Americans with disabilities, driving isn’t an option. Automated vehicles could change their lives.

Obama is out in front with the new 15-point checklist for manufacturers of driverless vehicles. What am I talking about? The NHTSA guidelines that were issued last week. Though the guidelines are a nudge rather than a limit on state regulation, Obama is very clear where federal authority reaches.

And make no mistake: If a self-driving car isn’t safe, we have the authority to pull it off the road. We won’t hesitate to protect the American public’s safety.

To Obama and NHTSA, the new guidelines are about fostering innovation while protecting safety.

The new guidelines also speak to software and the add/on equipment that could render a conventional vehicle driverless. More on the guidelines in a second.

Critical stuff

You can comment! The request for comment will be open for sixty (60) days, or about 52 days from now. The NHTSA guidance document is NOT mandatory. It's a first pitch, an opening bid, and an invitation to discussion.

Four warnings:

(1) This is a very long post. The devil is in the many details of the NHTSA and though I will mention many, there are lots more.

(2) The guidelines focus on NHTSA’s role as a safety-focused agency. I say the word “safety” with a grain of salt, given that we have continued to tolerate thousands and thousands of injuries and deaths on our nation’s roads for many decades. There are not many industries that the public would give a free pass to when a planeload of people die each week based on predictable design failures.

(3) What the guidelines do not take a position on and indeed effectively remain neutral about – due to NHTSA’s statutory mandate – are the significant issues related to vehicular design and access. I expressly highlight the neglect of the guidelines to address accessible vehicle design and interfaces for people with disabilities, people who speak different languages, and people who have low incomes. Both people who have low incomes and people with disabilities remain second-class citizens in our current auto-centric, inefficient, and expensive transportation system and culture. 

My first aside: We do not, as yet, demand redundant interfaces or that all vehicles be accessible. I'm talking about interfaces that allow for people who are blind and people who are deaf to use driverless vehicles, as well as for people who do not speak English. Wouldn’t it be great if shopping carts, wheelchairs, and strollers could be rolled onto every vehicle? Think of how many backaches would be prevented. Why not have a system like the ADA or like CAFÉ standards where we create an equitable transportation network by requiring equitable vehicles?

(4) I detect a great discomfort on NHTSA's part about vehicles with partially driverless capability, particularly the Tesla approach.

Oh yes

1. NHTSA needs a bigger budget.

2. There are lots of important details here, including reference to a new NHTSA Enforcement Bulletin, effective Sept. 20, 2016 (right now, the bulletin is the top document listed), which has additional important details. I read that as well. Warning: I found the document impossible to find by looking around the NHTSA website and I had to do a search, then guess when I got the results.

3. NHTSA is dividing the driverless world, basically, into two types of vehicles. The first is the partially self-driving vehicle type, such as the Tesla, while the second is the completely driverless variety. In the SAE international standards numerical parlance, that would be level 2 and under, and levels 3-5.

Juicy details are why I read

In the Enforcement Bulletin, on p. 5, there is a neutral-sounding, but (in my opinion) Tesla-focused warning:

Unreasonable risks due to predictable abuse or impractical recalibration requirements may constitute safety-related defects. ... Manufacturers have a continuing obligation to proactively identify and mitigate such safety risks.

In my opinion, the real teeth, the showing off of NHTSA's potential power, resides in the legal brief of the Enforcement Bulletin. In it NHTSA at the very least threatens to use its broad authority to address  safety concerns related to autonomous or partially autonomous vehicles AND their "foreseeable misuse." The bulletin states straight out on p. 15:

[A] semiautonomous driving system that allows a driver to relinquish control of the vehicle while it is in operation but fails to adequately account for reasonably foreseeable situations where a distracted or inattentive driver-occupant must retake control of the vehicle at any point may also be an unreasonable risk to safety.

I'm going to give page numbers and the corresponding bunch of quotes throughout the NHTSA guidelines. This is my cheat sheet to a long and detailed document. Sometimes I comment and sometimes not.

This is our playground 

Quote, p. 9

NHTSA will continue to exercise its available regulatory authority over HAVs using its existing regulatory tools: interpretations, exemptions, notice-and-comment rulemaking, and defects and enforcement authority. NHTSA has the authority to identify safety defects, allowing the Agency to recall vehicles or equipment that pose an unreasonable risk to safety even when there is no applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS). To aid regulated entities and the public in understanding the use of these tools (including the introduction of new HAVs), NHTSA has prepared a new information and guidance document. This document provides instructions, practical guidance, and assistance to entities seeking to employ those tools. Furthermore, NHTSA has streamlined its review process and is committing to issuing simple HAV-related interpretations in 60 days, and ruling on simple HAV-related exemption requests in six months.3 NHTSA will publish the section—which has wider application beyond HAVs—in the Federal Register for public review, comment and use. [Emphasis added.]

Existing model of self-certification

Basically, the FMVSS (Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards) and recall authority apply to all passenger vehicles - human operated and driverless alike.

Quote, p. 13

Under current law, manufacturers bear the responsibility to self-certify that all of the vehicles they manufacture for use on public roadways comply with all applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS). Therefore, if a vehicle is compliant within the existing FMVSS regulatory framework and maintains a conventional vehicle design, there is currently no specific federal legal barrier to an HAV being offered for sale.7 However, manufacturers and other entities designing new automated vehicle systems are subject to NHTSA’s defects, recall and enforcement authority.8 DOT anticipates that manufacturers and other entities planning to test and deploy HAVs will use this Guidance, industry standards and best practices to ensure that their systems will be reasonably safe under real-world conditions.

Oh yeah, and them

Quote, p. 14

In addition to safety, automated vehicles can provide significant, life-altering mobility benefits for persons with disabilities, older persons, and others who may not be considered in conventional design programs. DOT encourages manufacturers and other entities to consider the full array of users and their specific needs during the development process.

Voluntary reporting, NHTSA expectations, and PRA = Paperwork Reduction Act

NHTSA requests voluntary reporting and compliance with the name, title, and signature of an authorized company official and the date. (View p. 17.)

Quote, p. 18

For HAV systems already being tested and deployed, NHTSA expects that manufacturers and other entities will provide a Safety Assessment within four months after the completion of the PRA process, understanding that manufacturers and entities may wish to supplement their submissions over time. Similarly, for vehicles introduced, tested, or deployed either while the PRA process is pending or after the PRA process has been completed, NHTSA would expect manufacturers and other entities to provide a Safety Assessment at least four months before active public road testing begins on a new automated feature.

... new Safety Assessment letter to the Agency when any significant update(s) to a vehicle or HAV system is made. 

Note that the above applies to "material" software changes. I love words like "material" because they automatically give lawyers some work. PRA = Paperwork Reduction Act.

Clue to material or significant

Quote, p. 19

For example, with respect to the ODD [Operational Design Domain], if the capability of the HAV system is changed by a software or hardware update such that its capabilities with respect to speed range, roadway types on which it operates, geographic areas of operation, environmental conditions of operation (weather, day/nighttime), these would all be significant changes to the operational domain of the HAV system and have safety implications that the agency needs to monitor. Therefore, the manufacturer should submit a new Safety Assessment for those capabilities. For HAV OEDR capability, if there is a change to the set of normal driving scenarios (behavioral competencies) or pre-crash scenarios that the HAV system has the capability to address as a result of a software or hardware update, then this should also be summarized in revised Safety Assessment. Similarly, as discussed in section F, manufacturers should have a fall back approach that transitions a vehicle to a minimal risk condition when a problem is encountered with an HAV system. If the fall back strategy and the resulting implementation for achieving a minimum risk condition is changed by a software or hardware change, this change should be addressed in a new or revised Safety Assessment. 

Designed to work? Or not?

NHTSA leaves the issue of attention distraction to manufacturers. View p. 24 about the Human Machine interface.

Then a mixing of apples and oranges. Strange arrangement.

Quote, p. 25 - interaction design and where there is no human driver

In fully automated vehicles, manufacturers and other entities should design their HMI [Human Machine Interface] to accommodate people with disabilities (e.g., through visual, auditory, and haptic displays).25  

In designs where an HAV is intended to operate without a human driver or occupant, the remote dispatcher or central control authority should be able to know the status of the HAV at all times. Examples of these may include automated delivery vehicles, last mile special purpose ground drones, and automated maintenance vehicles.

Instant vehicle capabilities via software

NHTSA allows for the upcoming reality of conventional vehicles and partially self-driving to get software or software updates that render a vehicle more fully or completely driverless.

All vehicles, no matter what, must comply with vehicle safety specifications.

On p. 27, NHTSA addresses compliance with federal, state, and local laws required. No comment on patchwork or stifled innovation.

Discussion of ethical algorithms on p. 28.

Sometimes it works, and then it doesn't - the problem of your laptop is now the problem of your vehicle

On p. 32, NHTSA talks about the need for a fall back, what the vehicle should do if there is a malfunction that prevents driverless operation. This means software that allows for getting to a safe spot and/or alerting driver (if there is one).

The NHTSA guidelines seem to favor completely autonomous vehicles over partially driverless.

Quote, p. 32 

Fall back strategies should take into account that—despite laws and regulations to the contrary—human drivers may be inattentive, under the influence of alcohol or other substances, drowsy, or physically impaired in some other manner.

What testing and who will control it? On p. 33, NHTSA posits a role for Vehicle Testing Organizations with testing left up, essentially, to the manufacturer. NHTSA is not suggesting a mandatory testing regimen.  

Partially driverless = distracted drivers who are unable to immediately pop up to attention

The NHTSA Guidelines demonstrate considerable concern about partially driverless operating systems and "driver complacency" as well as assumptions that drivers understand exact parameters of different levels of automation and when they need to be attentive. 

On p. 34, NHTSA encourages testing for driver complacency.

Quote, p. 34

Manufacturers and other entities should assume that the technical distinction between the levels of automation (e.g., between Level 2 and Level 3) may not be clear to all users or to the general public. And, systems’ expectations of drivers and those drivers’ actual understanding of the critical importance of their “supervisory” role may be materially different 

...

Recognizing the complex human factors issues surrounding SAE Level 2 systems, DOT encourages the automotive industry to work with NHTSA to develop appropriate methods and metrics to understand and quantify effective human factors approaches to address potential risks from complacency and foreseeable misuse of such systems. 

Quote, p. 35 

... manufacturers and other entities should use available means to communicate, monitor, and limit uses of the automated vehicle systems when there is a reasonable expectation (or risk) of systems being used outside of their IODD or of drivers not performing the safety assurance role expected of them.

Nice table and agency wish list

On p. 36, there is a table about the applicability of particular guidelines to HAVs and partially autonomous vehicles. 

On p. 36-38, there is a NHTSA wish list and to-do list, which includes the mandatory submission of a Safety Assessment Letter.

Quote, p. 37

Automated Vehicle Classification: NHTSA will publish an objective method that manufacturers and other entities may use to classify their automated vehicle systems.

The wish list includes coordination with state partners. Translation: Not telling states what to do or taking over. List also covers new FMVSS.

Trying not to step on toes

The Model state policy seeks to avoid inconsistent state laws and also to clarify federal versus state jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities. (View p. 40.) 

Quote, p. 40

These general areas of responsibility should remain largely unchanged for HAVs. DOT and the Federal Government are responsible for regulating motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment, and States are responsible for regulating the human driver and most other aspects of motor vehicle operation. As motor vehicle equipment increasingly performs “driving” tasks, DOT’s exercise of its authority and responsibility to regulate the safety of such equipment will increasingly encompass tasks similar to “licensing” of the non-human “driver” (e.g., hardware and software performing part or all of the driving task). The Vehicle Safety Act expressly preempts States from issuing any standard that regulates performance if that standard is not identical to an existing FMVSS regulating that same aspect of performance

Yo Congress! Limits of NHTSA authority could use an expansion

Quote, p. 50

It is important to note that the Agency does not prohibit the introduction of new motor vehicles or motor vehicle technologies into the vehicle fleet, provided that those vehicles and technologies meet existing Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS).58 The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, NHTSA’s organic statute, creates a selfcertification system of compliance, in which vehicle and equipment manufacturers certify that their products meet applicable standards. NHTSA chooses vehicles and equipment from the fleet to test for compliance, and pursues enforcement actions when the Agency finds either a non-compliance or a defect posing an unreasonable risk to safety. NHTSA does not presently have authority to pre-approve new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle technologies. A vehicle or equipment manufacturer need ask NHTSA about a new technology or vehicle design only when it will not comply with applicable standards, or when there might be a question as to compliance. If a manufacturer anticipates having such a question, then requests for interpretations, exemptions, and rulemakings are the methods that a manufacturer can use to pursue answers from the Agency.

What I see in the section of the NHTSA guidance that will be problematic for technology companies, and perhaps a further spur to working through traditional vehicle manufacturers, is the guidance explaining all of the options for seeking interpretations of laws and regulations, exemptions from the federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS), and changes to or new regulations. 

Agency time versus Manufacturing and experimentation time

Cultures collide in this document. NHTSA gives long, detailed instructions about its procedures, including, for example, requests for letters of interpretation. I am thinking of the scenes in movies of bank clerks in 19^th century London or in the Harry Potter movies who review crinkly paper documents with an eye to careful precision rather than speed. But NHTSA is really trying here because for requests for letters of interpretation related to HAVs, so level 3 and above. NHTSA staff will issue an expedited response within 60 or 90 days, depending on the complexity of the request if a “appears to improve safety and follows the foregoing guidelines.”

Pre-FAST Act manufacturers versus post-FAST Act producers

Quote, p. 57

Congress recently amended the Vehicle Safety Act to allow certain vehicle manufacturers (those who, prior to enactment of the FAST Act, had manufactured and distributed FMVSS-compliant vehicles and have registered with NHTSA) to introduce non-FMVSS-compliant motor vehicles into interstate commerce “solely for purposes of testing or evaluation” so long as they “agree[] not to sell or offer for sale the motor vehicle at the conclusion of the testing or evaluation….”68 Manufacturers choosing this latter path should advise NHTSA of this action, but need not petition NHTSA for exemption.

In terms of the testing exemption for NHTSA refers to a possible two-track system for (1) traditional vehicle manufacturers who produced FMVSS-compliant vehicles prior to the FAST Act, and for (2) others. This provision allows any software company that is working with a traditional car manufacturer to essentially glob onto the car manufacturer’s status as a FMVSS-compliant entity and to benefit from the testing exemption:

to introduce non-FMVSS-compliant motor vehicles into interstate commerce “solely for purposes of testing or evaluation” so long as they “agree[] not to sell or offer for sale the motor vehicle at the conclusion of the testing or evaluation” (p. 57, FAST Act, Sec. 24404, to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30112(b)(10) (See note 68)).

So for testing by Google, Uber, Varden Labs, Comma.ai, Local Motors, EasyMile and other non-traditional makers or retrofitters of vehicles, is this exemption inapplicable because the companies are operating retrofitted conventional vehicles or their own creations? I guess the exemption is out of reach unless changes to a conventional vehicle that allow for driverless operation are made with the manufacturer’s knowledge and permission, such as in some type of joint venture. Cruise Automation, for example, would be covered because it is owned by GM. But a Local Motors minibus – Hello Olli – would not be eligible to benefit from the exemption. 

But those companies are otherwise classified because they produce so few vehicles. I use the word "produce" loosely because even Google and Uber are basically retrofitting traditional vehicles, as are other companies. I admit that this is an area I am ignorant about, so take my words with a big grain of salt.

Of course, temporary exemptions are available to cover these companies; these companies need only apply, which takes time to produce the paperwork and for an NHTSA response to arrive. (Local Motors and EasyMile, for examples, are different because they are producing their own specialized vehicles.)

Up to p. 69 and still paying attention - and trying to stay awake

NHTSA is, perhaps, engaging in a mea culpa. I have not been a follower of NHTSA, so I’m intrigued, but clueless, about where this is coming from. NHTSA is admitting to prior unwise conduct and publicly resolves to be better in the future. So what is this information buried in an unexciting portion of the NHTSA guidelines? NHTSA acknowledges straight out that it has not been consistent in its responses to petitions for rulemaking, repetitions for rulemaking.

As if to say, new sheriff in town, NHTSA states:

The processes of developing and adopting new rules are time-consuming and can be expensive. These processes involve identifying and gathering reliable data; carefully analyzing it to determine the nature and extent of safety problems; identifying and analyzing alternative solutions; choosing a solution; and developing and validating effective performance requirements and test procedures for the chosen solution. Moving forward, NHTSA seeks to focus its resources on its priority activities, rather than on developing data or performing analysis that could and should have been included in the submitter’s document. (P. 68)

Unwrapping some new tools

This document goes beyond the expected (or what I expected) in terms of addressing procedural matters as well as substantive regulation. NHTSA is addressing the new universe in which it operates. Instead of regulating a 20^th Century world of human drivers and manually-operated equipment, a world where new equipment must be installed at some sort of maintenance facility, NHTSA is now moving into the 21^st Century, into the current universe, where it must review software updates that can be installed remotely and instantaneously as well as vehicle systems (anti-lock brakes as one example) that operate without human intervention.

As guidance for operating in a universe with immediate software changes that alter the capabilities of a vehicle, NHTSA looks to the FAA because that is (1) another DOT agency (my two cents, not in document), and (2) NHTSA perceives that the FAA has a similar safety-regulatory role and similar technology challenges with such things as autopilot software. As explained in Appendix II, like FAA, NHTSA delegates some of its safety responsibilities to the industry it regulates. Self-certification is a prime example. 

Up for discussion and possible adoption will be:

• Pre-market safety assessments and assurances,
• Pre-market approval (example is the aforementioned autopilot software), and
• Self-certification.

Toy balloons

There’s also a toy balloon floated about adopting a mix of the above approaches. By the way, any pre-market approval system would require new legislation. NHTSA leadership believes that replacing the current self-certification system for one requiring pre-approval would constitute a wholesale change in its operations. It warns in the guidance that a significant increase in NHTSA funding would be necessary to execute a substantially new role of pre-approval of vehicles. There’s a portion of the text devoted to what NHTSA can do with its limited resources. NHTSA is clearly crying out that there will be no free lunch in terms of a greater role in assessing safety.

SNHTSA acknowledges the several years’ long process that occurs when FAA reviews new airliners. (See Appendix II for details.) I can’t imagine either the automotive industry or the software industry accepting such a long and hidebound process. The question is whether consumer watchdog and other types organizations (not to mention the public) will use this opportunity to press for a greater role for NHTSA. Right now, I get the feeling that the public conflates electric, connected, partially self-driving, and completely autonomous vehicles into one pile of laundry that it assumes someone else will put in the washer. (I often have conversations that remind me of how little most people are paying attention to these issues.)

A hybrid process of self-certification and pre-approval is also possible. One idea floated is to continue the current FMVSS self-certification system and add pre-approval for HAV systems. However, NHTSA specifically asks for comments and it is not limiting itself to the specific options mentioned. NHTSA is concerned about keeping up with the pace of vehicle model improvements. I doubt it will go for any system that will present significant delays or squelching of innovation. Also, an addition of any pre-approval system, whether wholesale or restricted to particular technologies, would require statutory change.

Two other ideas that NHTSA puts out there would also require new legislation. These are cease-and-desist authority and broader exemption authority. Again, each of these could be used as part of a new mix of regulatory cocktail to allow NHTSA to regulate safety effectively.

No discussion about authority over certain kinds of software

Quote, p. 79

NHTSA has authority to regulate the safety of software changes provided by manufacturers after a vehicle’s first sale to a consumer. The Agency may need to develop additional regulatory tools and rules to regulate the certification and compliance verification of such post-sale software updates.

NHTSA sees itself as limited as far as having the authority to require particular “driving tests” for HAVs. On what kinds of roads, courses, and under what conditions could this be done? NHTSA has interpreted its legal framework in such a way that it seeks clarification from Congress to allow for nimble testing variations as technology develops. NHTSA needs to be able to act in real time just as the companies it regulates are able to do so. That is so not the usual government structure and systems.

And more on authority NHTSA currently lacks. Quote, p. 80

The Agency’s authority under 49 U.S.C. §§ 30166(e) and (m)(3)(B) could be used to require the reporting described above to the extent that the reporting could be shown to aid in the identification of possible safety-related defects and in ensuring that manufacturers are satisfying their duties with respect to such defects. The Agency may need additional authority to allow it to ensure that manufacturers take all necessary and appropriate steps to verify, validate and debug software.

Bottom line: Encouraging innovation and not squelching it

NHTSA is rightfully concerned that its testing protocols and requirements do not inhibit innovation. NHTSA makes an open invitation for suggestions about how to balance testing and support for technological experimentation (a/k/a risk-taking) in a way that is technology neutral (love that term) or agnostic. NHTSA expresses practical concerns. “Given that many of the changes would involve software and given the speed with which software evolves, these assessments might need to be conducted fairly frequently.”

In this area, NHTSA declares unequivocally that it already has authority to act. “NHTSA may conduct innovation impact analyses, provide for regular reassessments, and establish sunset clauses under existing authority.” (p. 82)

  

Paperwork, paperwork, paperwork – What is necessary? What is basically a overkill?

NHTSA is confident that it is on safe ground in mandating reporting. The questions are at what points, how often, and what must be reported. These questions are implicitly raised, but NHTSA does not offer a global framework. Rather the agency essentially raises issues and seems open to suggestions from those who feel sufficiently impacted (no pun intended) to offer their opinions.  This will be conventional car and vehicle manufacturers, technology companies, groups of these private parties, and some consumer public interest organizations.

The possibilities for data collection are enormous with the existing software and software that will be incorporated into HAVs. NHTSA states that it has authority to impose requirements in this regard. It is also specifically pointing to one technology it is considering requiring being placed into every self-driving vehicle.

Black boxes and crash reporting

Quote, p 82

NHTSA believes enhanced event data recorders would be useful to allow the Agency to reconstruct the circumstances of crashes and to gain an understanding of how a vehicle involved in a crash or incident sensed and responded to its driving environment immediately before and during the crash or near crash. Such data could provide insight to the answers to such crash- reconstruction-related questions as whether there were other roadway users nearby shortly before the crash or incident and whether the vehicle correctly and timely identified the other users and anticipated their speed and trajectories.

But NHTSA does not end there; it also floats the idea of following the lead of California’s reporting requirement for any incident. The practice is already being used and it can be employed as a starting point. Question: Should reporting be limited to crashes, to all crashes, only major crashes, expanded to near crashes?

And then NHTSA throws out another idea.

Quote, p. 83

[T]he Agency could require manufacturers to provide documents (e.g., build sheets) describing the safety equipment and safety-system-related software for crash-involved vehicles upon request. To provide a baseline of vehicles with and without certain safety features or capabilities, the Agency might require such information for all vehicles, not just those involved in crashes.

We need help! - in different many words

NHTSA expresses a practical and substantial concern that it needs technological, cutting-edge expertise and the agency acknowledges implicitly that these experts will not be NHTSA employees. NHTSA likely will never have the funding to pay for sufficient technological expertise and such experts probably want to remain in the private sector. NHTSA proposes, without any specificity, that it should in some way create a group of experts that the agency can consult and thereby benefit from their expertise. My take is that NHTSA wants to have the advantage of expertise that exists and as it evolves without needing to employ many experts.

But NHTSA also expressly recognizes that it must hire some experts, if only to judge what other experts are doing or saying. In this regard, NHTSA is less confident in what it will be able to accomplish. It throws out the idea of hiring, and then posits possibilities if hiring authority proves impossible. Basically, the alternatives in that case are contractors and consultants.

The NHTSA wish list is to hire.  A long quote is worthwhile to demonstrate the ambition of NHTSA in terms of adequately regulating the HAV sector that it believes is emerging.

Beware: Long quote

Quote, p. 84

NHTSA needs to be able to build quickly a cadre of in-house experts in cutting edge areas of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. Given the newness of HAVs and the private sector demand for persons with the necessary types of scientific expertise to work with those technologies, there is a shortage of suitable candidates to meet the Agency’s critical hiring needs. Particularly if the Agency were to adopt some type of pre-market approval approach, it would need substantial additional numbers of persons qualified to conduct pre-market testing and analysis on a fairly large scale. The Agency could use a number of special hiring tools to enable it to hire qualified applicants with very specialized skills: 1. Direct hiring authority (as DOT currently can use for IT Security Specialists) that allows applicants to be selected directly from the qualified list of candidates without regard to veterans’ preference;2. Term appointments;3. Greater flexibility on pay; and4. Other recruitment, relocation, and retention incentives.

Diamonds in the footnotes

Oh gosh, I am so ready to be finished reading this document, so I am definitely not being sufficiently attentive to analyze each footnote. I am going to point to only a few and I am completely certain that I am failing to mention quite significant ones.

Footnote 25: NHTSA basically says it wishes it could do more to help people with disabilities.

Entities are encouraged to seek technical and engineering advice from members of the disabled community and otherwise engage with that community to develop designs informed by its needs and experiences.

There are lots of footnotes devoted to the bureaucratically-mind-boggling nature of the Paperwork Reduction Act. Those are my words. Obviously, NHTSA is not putting anything that way.

Footnote 49: NHTSA is not seeking agreement or approval by states.

The purpose of NHTSA’s collaboration with States and other stakeholders was to obtain their individual views and input and to exchange facts and information. NHTSA did not seek consensus recommendations from these stakeholders.

Footnote 51: A sharp statement about state versus federal responsibilities.

NHTSA does not expressly regulate motor vehicle (or motor vehicle equipment) performance in-use, after first sale, but because NHTSA’s standards apply to the vehicle or equipment when first manufactured, and because taking a vehicle or piece of equipment out of compliance with an applicable standard can be a violation of the Safety Act, the influence of NHTSA’s FMVSS extends through the life of the vehicle even if NHTSA is not directly regulating it. At the same time, States have the authority to regulate a vehicle’s in-use performance (as through safety inspection laws), but as the text here states, State regulations cannot conflict with applicable FMVSS.

Footnote 55: A seed of figuring out a regulatory system that allows for state-by-state participation. Notice the quotation marks around the word operator. We can define operator such that this is no longer a human.

Typically, a driver’s license from one State in the United States is honored by all other States, so a driver’s license from any State would be valid to allow an “operator” to operate a motor vehicle in any other State.

Footnote 60: Let’s use international cooperation to reduce barriers. 

With respect to international coordination, DOT recognizes that it is important to avoid regulatory inefficiencies and concurrently maximize safety as we collectively strive to facilitate the introduction of HAVs into the marketplace. DOT is actively working to remove potential regulatory barriers for HAVs, both in the U.S. and abroad. DOT is actively involved at the World Forum for the Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations and directly with individual foreign governments. These activities are intended to reduce barriers to innovation while preserving safety. Where appropriate, DOT will intensify its efforts to develop well-designed and globally-consistent regulations for HAVs.

For example, skip to footnote 106 for some elaboration.

Both the U.S. and Canada use self-certification for their vehicle safety standards. Use of the same approach in both countries facilitates U.S.-Canada regulatory cooperation and the operation of the closely integrated U.S.-Canada motor vehicle industry. 

Followed quickly by footnote 107, which contrasts the pre-approval process that the European Union mandates. Footnote 108 notes that while there are benefits to pre-approval, this would necessitate a major shift for the US. One senses NHTSA’s skepticism.

Holding up the rear – Appendices

These are quick descriptions, not complete ones, for each appendix.

Appendix I – Current NHTSA rules for petitions for rulemaking

Appendix II – FAA regulatory tools (being cited as instructive)

Appendix III – Next steps.

Coming up

My highlights from the NHTSA to-do list, post-issuance of these guidelines:

Comment period

More public meeting(s),

Anonymous data sharing, perhaps via a third party aggregator,

Work with industry associations and voluntary groups to address priority safety areas,

Coordination with state governments. A role for AASHTO (American Association of State Highway Transportation Officials)?,

“Automated Vehicle Classification: NHTSA will publish an objective method that manufacturers and other entities may use to classify their automated vehicle systems.”

Collection of data,

Put a rule in force to require a Safety Assessment Letter,

Registration system for HAVs, and

Consider updates to FMVSS.

Cheat sheet - Model State Policy

The quick list relating to the model state policy:

Public comment, stakeholder engagement, technical or other assistance for areas where states may lack expertise, and coordination with Canada and Mexico.

I so deserve to rest my brain right now. Big sigh of relief.