#7 Comments in Response to NHTSA ANPRM

Comments tally

Disclaimer/Explanation: Please note that anonymous comments and ones where the author's background is undeclared or not easily discovered are counted as "regular people" unless it becomes apparent that the commenter has professional expertise, which then shifts the comment into that category. Also note that the comments tally includes those comments summarized below in this blog post. All categorizations are my own and might seem random or wrong to someone else.  I am not an engineer, an automotive geek, or a software expert.

Comments are due by Feb. 1, 2021. 

The following is a tally as of Jan. 14, 2020: Total comments to the Framework for Automated Driving System Safety Advance Notice of Proposed Rule Making (ANPRM) issued by NHTSA - 16 

Note: Many comments have flowed in since Jan. 19 and those are listed below. I have not yet read or classified them.

Anonymous - 2

Companies or Organizations - 4

Safety standards or framework - 2 

Training for human in-vehicle or remote operators - 1 

Individuals with professional expertise - 6

Safety - 5

Cybersecurity -2  

Regular people - 4 

Regular people who want increased safety - 3

Regular people who do not believe AVs will be safer than human drivers - 1

Regular people who do not want regulation to constrain innovation - 1

Spam comments - 1

Instructions for submitting comments can be found in the ANPRM.

Please note that these comments are not necessarily representative of the opinions of the US population; rather they come from corporate or non-profit entities or professionals with an interest in AVs, or people with the time, energy, and space in their lives attend public meetings - in this case to devote attention to Federal Register notices. The regulation-making process is, if not hidden, then placed out of the way in the bowels of federal agencies, and is oft forgotten when we vote or choose where we participate in our democracy.  

I need an extension!

Comment of the Consumer Technology Association (CTA), submitted by Michael Petricone, Senior Vice President, Government Affairs: 

The comment is listed under Mr. Petricone's name in the comment list. According to its polished website, CTA is the "trade association representing the $422 billion U.S. consumer technology industry, which supports more than 18 million U.S. jobs." Its members include Adobe, 3D printing companies, battery companies, helicopter companies, Blackberry, Boingo - and I am only up to the Bs. Some AV companies that are members are Cruise, Lyft, Beep, Mobileye, Ford, Toyota, Aurora and Velodyne, as examples. Not Waymo, Tesla, Easy Mile, or May Mobility. CTA is also a standards organization across many fields. In terms of the many areas of expertise among its members, it includes accessibility and sustainability. advocacy, In its advocacy on Capitol Hill and in state capitols, CTA is generally pro-innovation and anti-regulation. This is the association that puts on a major technology conference every year, CES (Consumer Electronics Show).

CTA's comment is merely a request to extend the response time for 30 days. CTA only mentions the importance of the topic to CTA's members and the significance that a NHTSA framework would mean to the AV industry. No specific reason for the 30-day extension request is given.

We have classes available

Comment of Driving School Association of the Americas (DSAA):

Are you thinking what I'm thinking? It is not only human drivers who will lose their jobs when AVs come along, but also those in the industries surrounding driving, such as driving school owners and instructors. DSAA offers trainings and educational materials to its members - "driving school owners, including entrepreneurs, public and private school teachers, former examiners, transportation and safety experts."

The DSAA comment, however, does not concern itself with highly automated vehicles, or what I term AVs, but with driver assistance systems, such as the Tesla Auto-Pilot and, inappropriately named, the Tesla Self-Driving Package. DSAA declares that additional driver training and consumer education are necessary for the safe operation of vehicles with driver assistance systems, which partially automate many vehicles today. This is a good point and I will add to DSAA's comment by saying that airline pilots receive training that deals with the special dangers of partial automation, which can cause complacence and lack of appropriate monitoring by a human operator. But DSAA's comment only addresses driver training. "Given the nature of this evolving technology, appropriate regulation will be necessary to ensure the manufacturers produce and provide these necessary training components along with additional consumer training by professional traffic safety organizations, such as DSAA."

Coming Up  

Comments of: 

1. League of American Bicyclists
2. Aerospace Engineer anonymous
3. Humanetics
4. David DeVeau
5. Car ReFormat comment from Ralph Panhuyzen - listed as a document rather than a comment
6. National Conference of State Legislatures
7. Gary Schifmiller
8. Alan Kailer
9. Anna Walters
10. James Hooper
11. Dave Simmons
12. Richard Millsap
13. Allison Burson
14. Lance Jacobs
15. Michael Kelley
16. Champe Burnley
17. Rob Eckmann
18. Mark Dehanke
19. Jay Ellis
20. Robert Nelson
21. Steve Betts
22. Ira Josephs
23. Sean Hunt
24. Stephen Minster

#6 Comments in Response to NHTSA ANPRM: Comment Tally and Tech- Agnostic, Informed Comment

AV stuff to read

• NJ AV Task Force report
• Latest UK Law Commission AV report

Preview alert: I will be getting to these two reports and I will also write something tying together all of the fabulous UK Law Commission AV reports. No promises on timing.

Comments tally

Disclaimer/Explanation: Please note that anonymous comments and ones where the author's background is undeclared or not easily discovered are counted as "regular people" unless it becomes apparent that the commenter has professional expertise, which then shifts the comment into that category. Also note that the comments tally includes those comments summarized below in this blog post. All categorizations are my own and might seem random or wrong to someone else.  I am not an engineer, an automotive geek, or a software expert.

Comments are due by Feb. 1, 2021. 

As of Dec. 29, 2020, total comments to the Framework for Automated Driving System Safety Advance Notice of Proposed Rule Making (ANPRM) issued by NHTSA - 14 

Anonymous - 2

Companies or Organizations - 2

Safety standards or framework - 2 

Individuals with professional expertise - 6

Safety - 5

Cybersecurity -2  

Regular people - 4 

Regular people who want increased safety - 3

Regular people who do not believe AVs will be safer than human drivers - 1

Regular people who do not want regulation to constrain innovation - 1

Spam comments - 1

Instructions for submitting comments can be found in the ANPRM.

Please note that these comments are not necessarily representative of the opinions of the US population; rather they come from corporate or non-profit entities or professionals with an interest in AVs, or people with the time, energy, and space in their lives attend public meetings - in this case to devote attention to Federal Register notices. The regulation-making process is, if not hidden, then placed out of the way in the bowels of federal agencies, and is oft forgotten when we vote or choose where we participate in our democracy. 

Two comment summaries - one short and one very long

(1) Comment of Craig McKee: This short comment is brief and expresses the opinion that we should remember that we will be shifting from a human-operated technology that has been with us for over 100 years, but that daily commute driving is "mundane" even for an avowed "driving enthusiast." Mr. McKee is hoping that AVs bring increased safety.

Juicy comment should be read slowly and carefully

(2) Comment of Mapless AI: This 10-page comment is submitted by a company that develops "safety critical artificial intelligence for automated driving." The firm is located in Boston and Pittsburgh, and it is seeking staff, as of today, to work on machine learning and robotics. Mapless AI is active on LinkedIn for anyone who wants to learn more. This comment is structured according to the NHTSA questions in the ANPRM and it was written by authors of AV safety publications.

Mapless AI favors the NHTSA development of a safety framework to enable AV safety and public acceptance.  Because the Mapless AI comment uses engineering language and refers to systems engineering standards with which I am unfamiliar, I will do my best to do this comment justice and I welcome corrections, though this is a summary and not a play-by-play reiteration. The comment argues in favor of adopting specific systems engineering standards in order to remain technology agnostic and to reduce crashes. Numbers for those standards are mentioned in the comment.

NHTSA is in the singular institutional position to declare standards, according to the comment. "Others have tried and failed to agree on standards. The data could be expressed as the expected value of miles between accident types in specific ODDs." In its focus on ODDs - operational design domains - Mapless AI is wisely calling for a comparison of apples with apples and oranges with oranges so that rural winding roads with little traffic and no signals are not lumped in with 34th Street in the middle of Manhattan or even, I would hope, with the suburbs of Kansas City. But, as Mapless AI contends in the comment, this could be classified by speed rather than my own personal distinctions.

This would allow development to focus on safety of the design with clear data available to construct targets. The Agency would not restrict new development. The Agency would support innovation.

Time out: AV video from a student in Australia. The concept AV pod is somewhere between a Coney Island bumper car, a personal rapid transit vehicle, and a space-age, mobility-on-demand transit vehicle. I like the almost Ragtime musical accompaniment.

Comment's central theme presupposes adequate funding for NHTSA

To ensure accountability, the Mapless AI comment suggests that self-certification would be permitted, but with required information to be supplied to NHTSA about "core safety elements." Mapless AI recommends "accident metrics" for particular ODDs. [Note: This comment should not, in my opinion, be employing the word "accident" when it is not at all an unforeseen or rare occurrence that crashes happen on US roads. "Crash" is the preferred term.] The comment presupposes that NHTSA will have sufficient funding and expertise at the agency to adequately review the information submitted in the self-certifications and that performance requirements would aim for safer operation of vehicles with AVs than we currently have with human drivers. The comment comes back again and again to its theme, that we have technology agnostic performance standards that focus on safety.

While “see, think, act” is sometimes seen in the industry, it comprehends sensing, perception, planning, and control. Safety has been defined as the absence of unreasonable risk. Failures in any of these areas may lead to unreasonable risk in an ADS. However, while a set of core elements may enhance comprehension, safety does not require core elements. The result must be safe independent of the presence of a specific choice of core elements.

Even later in the comment, when responding to NHTSA's questions about additional research, the Mapless AI comment returns to this theme.

Mapless AI also suggests that NHTSA reframe its way of judging and categorizing in order to simplify standards. The comment posits that only two categories are needed: "the safety-preserving portion of the system and the non-safety-preserving portion of the system."

Time to regulate?

In response to whether regulation is necessary at this early stage, the Mapless AI comment advises that we will not be sacrificing innovation, and we may increase safety, if we require the submission of summary information to NHTSA. The comment offers a weighing of costs and benefits, that the cost to companies "may be partially offset by the data provided by NHTSA. Experience using this proposal may lead to improvements including simplifications or increased focus. More prescriptive regulation is not recommended. More prescription requires more experience." Indeed, instead of requiring that companies provide AVs to NHTSA, the comment advises that the above summary information and framework will ordinarily be sufficient.

For those truly educated in the engineering weeds, I recommend that you read this comment because it poses possible standards for systems engineering and safety analyses that I do not understand well, if at all. The bottom line for non-engineers does not cover the very important details in the comment. I would posit that the bottom line is contained in this response to one of NHTSA's specific questions: "The minimum evidence [that NHTSA should require] is a combination of vehicle testing, simulation, and analyses showing that ADS has exceeded the current expected value of miles between the types of accidents that the ADS has the authority to cause."  

Disclosure recommended

The comment recommends (1) well-organized, particular information summary requirements, (2) minimum performance metrics, (3) flexibility in adjusting standards and information requirements, and (4) openness and sharing of information. "Such a summary could be requested even if it is an interim for a product in development. This enables improvement of the supplier’s safety case, uniformity of safety criteria, improvement of consumer confidence, and a basis for improvement of future administrative mechanisms." Very much implied in this comment is a NHTSA with  the capacity to monitor AV information and research data.

Time out: Movie recommendation 

(The movie clip features Joan Blondell as the wonderful aunt in A Tree Grows in Brooklyn.)

The comment seems to state - in my translation of engineering-oriented language - that the price of requiring information and establishing basic performance standards are (1) sufficient expertise and resources at NHTSA and (2) private companies adjusting to a uniform system, which could spur competition based on safety results. Again, comparing those apples with apples instead of oranges would be enabled.

I see the clouds clearing and the sun emerging with the logical arguments of this comment.

The three standards referenced in the framework are already well known in the automotive industry and are being included in the development process already by some ADS suppliers. The NHTSA data supports a uniform basis for competition and consistent consumer information. NHTSA fulfils [sic] its mission per the Safety Act. Technological advancement is not hindered. Compliance rewards results.

Finally, and in response to NHTSA questions in the ANPRM, Mapless AI argues in its comment that NHTSA clearly has statutory authority to follow the Mapless AI recommendations. I apologize for not adequately summarizing this comment for those of you who are engineers.

Non-Transportation Nerd People Express Different Concerns - #5 Comments in Response to ANPRM

1. P Douglas House comment - This short comment shows the value of a democratized and open regulatory development process. Here is an ordinary person, self-described as a driver for over 50 years, who is expressing his concerns with a complex technology. This is the core of Mr. House's anxiety: "I think it's insane to turn our cars and trucks into hackable, internet-connected, overly-complex computers driven by millions of lines of software-code that will be subject to frequent "updates" over the internet and will be just as frail, vulnerable and unreliable as every other computer and internet-connected system in the modern world." He also worries about handing over our collective safety to the likes of Apple, Microsoft, and Google, as a "recipe for disaster."

Point taken; now counterpoint. If one talks with non-transportation nerds, aka regular people, one often hears the concerns above expressed in practically the same breath as the concerns articulated in the next comment.

2. Comment of Thomas Rutter - This brief comment shows concern that regulation will hamstring innovation and that any tragedies along the road to broad AV adoption will delay further advances for a technology that will save lives. Mr. Rutter cites the example of nuclear power. In his opinion, "[w]e tend to go too far when a bad thing happens in regulation, for instance in the case of nuclear power we have limited ourselves so much that many do not have access to this clean energy source." He believes that regulation should provide guidance without proscribing limitations.

3. Comment of Brighton Barber - Another brief comment that seems to be offered by a regular person. The comment requests that we err on the side of caution, given that thousands of AVs will be on our roads. This person awaits a safer future and does not seem to be anti-technology. 

It is nice to know that regular people pay attention to the Federal Register and take the time to contribute their thoughts. 

 

Brief, Spam, and Substantive Comments - #4 Comments in Response to NHTSA ANPRM

1. Spam comment from John John. I think this was something akin to a road sign selling something. No need to elaborate.

2. Second anonymous comment - This comment is quite brief and the commenter appreciates how NHTSA is establishing a framework for assessing AV safety and functionality. This person thinks it is important to work closely with the scientists and developers involved. 

3. Comment of Michael DeKort - I am assuming that this is the Michael DeKort mentioned on Wikipedia as a whistleblower who won a lawsuit against Lockheed Martin after he was fired for reporting on faulty equipment being installed on Coast Guard vessels. Mr. DeKort attempted to report the defect up the agency food chain and tried to alert major newspapers to the problem, to no avail. This Mr. DeKort has valid AV credentials; according to his LinkedIn profile, he has served on SAE AV committees. He lists a bunch of AV-related podcast episodes and he also has aerospace experience.

Mr. DeKort's comment is exactly the same as the comment and blog post of Mr. Patrick Coyle, reviewed in my earlier blog post about comments submitted.

Editorial interruption - adult whining on my part about comments submitted without background information about the author. Repeat of earlier rant in my head. No foot stomping, yet, on this one.

Advice on what a safety framework should look like

4. Comment of David Gelperin - I assume that this is the Mr. Gelperin who is a software engineering expert. One of his specialties is risk management relating to software and he is the CTO and President of ClearSpecs Enterprises. He submitted two brief attachments as his comments. 

Mr. Gelperin gives a definite yes to regulating AVs before widespread deployment and he calls safety "THE core quality attribute that NHTSA is considering. Safety in NOT a functional element. It is a quality attribute that crosscuts all functional elements." He advises NHTSA to list deadly hazards of AVs and then associate mitigations of these hazards. "NHTSA should provide lists of core hazards both to and from an ADS with an unconstrained domain, along with their mitigation alternatives."

Mr. Gelperin likes the idea noted in the ANPRM that AVs be programmed to drive defensively, but he points out that this must be a "verifiable, comprehensive, consensus mode," which perhaps NHTSA should take the lead in developing. 

Emergency stopping button - like on a subway car

Mr. Gelperin calls for AVs to have an emergency stopping button that a passenger may press. He goes into great detail - necessary, practical detail - about how this emergency stopping function could work: how it should be verifiable, invokable by the ADS (automated driving system) controller, and an "isolated copy when the main control platform does not respond to a liveness check." Basically, the main control platform would be continually checked by an isolated platform.

If I get the summary slightly wrong, due to terminology for software systems engineering, the gist is clear in terms of redundancy and continuous checking. 

Mr. Gelperin has a logical mind and he offers practical advice for how an emergency stopping function would operate, including in the unusual circumstance of a person using an AV to rush to a hospital. 

Monitoring ADS behavior could be done by hardware, software, and passengers, as well as other vehicles, and remote observers. I think it’s too early to rule out any form of monitoring. I suggest that monitoring be tied to hazard management. An inventory of hazards from an ADS could be developed and then mitigations for some would start with their detection by monitoring or self-checking.

Mr. Gelperin warns at the end of his comment (in the second attachment):

All ADS software requirements should be publicly available or independently reviewed including quality attributes, basic function sets, design constraints and implementation constraints. Without skeptical reviews, such requirements are likely to be seriously flawed for many reasons. The current non-collaborative environment is very dangerous and ignores most of what we know about human behavior. [Emphasis added.]

Chemical Facility Security News and Two Short Comments - #3 Comments in Response to NHTSA ANPRM

This post will review three comments, all submitted by individuals. Let me just gripe that anyone who submits a comment should supply their background, experience, or education so that the reader can take into account the perspective of the submitter when considering the comments. That would also be helpful for NHTSA staff.

1. Chemical Facility Security News author

Patrick Coyle submitted a comment that he also posted on Dec. 3, 2020 in the Chemical Facility Security News, a daily blog about chemical security and safety issues that does not appear to be affiliated with any business, non-profit organization, or professional association. According to the blog's "About" section, Mr. Coyle has: 

15 years experience in the US Army with extensive experience in training development, delivery and evaluation. He spent 20 years working in the chemical process industry developing and improving chemical manufacturing processes with a large emphasis on chemical and process safety. He currently writes a daily blog, the Chemical Facility Security News, examining the issues associated with the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards administered by the Department of Homeland Security.

The blog, which dates back 13 years, currently averages approximately 30 posts per month, but in previous years the total number of posts climbed as high as 700. According to Mr. Coyle's LinkedIn profile, he has deep experience in drafting "reports on rework investigations and safety incidents that provide a wealth of information for subsequent investigations." Clearly this is a person who is familiar with ensuring safety with careful development and following of procedures.

In his comment/blog post, Mr. Coyle does a nice job of summarizing NHTSA's stated goals for seeking guidance and the framework that NHTSA aims to develop for autonomous vehicles (AVs). This is no easy task because the ANPRM is long and detailed.

Cybersecurity focus

Mr. Coyle has a very engineering-type perspective. Given the topic of his blog, it is no surprise that Mr. Coyle focuses on cybersecurity in his comments. He aptly points out that "Not a single one of the 24 specific questions that NHTSA proposed for response addressed cybersecurity topics." and he continues:

NHTSA missed the boat by not including a fifth ‘core function’ for ADS; “Protection”. In keeping with the language of the ANPRM, “protection” would refer to the ability of the ADS system to continue to protect the safety of the vehicle’s occupants in the event of an electronic failure due to component failure, communication (internal or external) disruption or cyberattack. In process safety terms, this means that the system has mechanisms and protocols in place to ensure that it fails in an inherently safe manner.

Mr. Coyle supplies a few examples of obvious areas where failures would be dangerous and, therefore, failure prediction and mitigation should be embedded into the testing and regulation of AVs. He mentions interruptions of software updates, sensor operation, power, and communications. 

For cybersecurity go to another agency

In terms of NHTSA's perspective, keeping cybersecurity out of the ANPRM and AV regulation in general makes sense. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), after all, is the federal agency with jurisdiction over any communications technology and the Department of Homeland Security, as well as the FBI and the Department of Justice, each have a piece of the regulatory thicket of cybersecurity, not to mention authority to investigate and prosecute criminal activity.

To the average person, however, such division of jurisdiction over one type of product, in this case AVs, might not make sense. 

2. Next comment is anonymous

Although the next comment submitted is anonymous, thus providing no context about the submitting person's perspective, it focuses on the same theme as Mr. Coyle's comment. While I would direct the anonymous submitter to a grammar and writing style course, this person manages to get the idea across that we should have performance safety standards and integrate safety into AV development procedures, similar to the way that the aerospace industry operates. 

Anonymous does know what they are talking about, mentioning Mobileye's proposed open safety model called Responsibility Sensitive Safety. "These types of safety standards focus on the measurable performance of an ADS while encouraging consumer confidence in an open standard." This submitter would accept at least some simulation as part of safety testing.

3. Author, maybe?

Phil Rink, perhaps the engineer, inventor and children's author, submitted another similar comment. I am guessing that this is the same Phil Rink, but, because the comment author never says anything about themself, conjecture is all I have available. That Phil Rink invented an underwater camera, which became a standard, and sold his company; he has also authored a couple of books for children of about 8-11, from a cursory look.

Mr. Rink submits a comment that seemingly refers to partial vehicle automation and makes a point that I have harped on endlessly.

When the automation fails, and it will fail, the human driver will not be able to detect the failure soon enough to prevent the failure. If notified by the automation, the human will not be able to gain situational awareness soon enough to choose a corrective action and apply that action. Things happen too quickly in driving situations, and especially in uncommon situations, which is where the automation will fail.

Mr. Rink also seems to refer to and prefer the concept of the operational design domain (ODD) and he would ban AV operation on public roads outside of an AV's ODD.

Non-affiliated - #2 Comment in Response to NHTSA's ANPRM

Here is a summary of a comment submitted by individual on his own behalf in response to NHTSA's ANPRM, and not submitted for a business, non-profit, or advocacy group.

Test until proven - on racetracks

Lawrence Theisen submitted a comment. I think that I found out who this is, but, because I am not certain, I will not write about the individual whom I discovered through a roundabout search. I will guess that Mr. Thiesen is knowledgable about the auto industry as he submits his comment from an affluent suburb near Detroit. (No comment of my own about the Detroit suburbs as I am generally snarky about suburbs in general and I did not fall in love when I did spend time there.)

Mr. Theisen offered a brief comment that suggests that "motorsports," meaning auto racing, is the prime venue/activity for autonomous vehicle (AV) testing and has served in this capacity, unofficially, in the past. 

Once [AVs] can handle these conditions; starting and managing driving in packs on the tracks and entering and leaving pit lanes safely, recognizing vehicle issues (flat tires, accidents and visual queues (flags and lights), they should be ready for limited on-road testing.

Mr. Theisen additionally requests that NHTSA pay attention to cybersecurity so that hacking while traveling down a highway is not a worry. I think that we can all agree on that.

My NHTSA ANPRM Tally - thus far

• 1 comment from a professional association
• 1 comment from an individual

Next: A comment originally published in the Chemical Facility Security News.

As of today, NHTSA has received 11 comments and the deadline is Feb. 1, 2021.

National Society of Professional Engineers - #1 Comment in Response to NHTSA's ANPRM

 

For a recap from my last post - While comments submitted in response to an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) are public, they do not tend to receive much media coverage. Because the current  NHTSA ANPRM about autonomous vehicles (AVs) is important, I will be summarizing the comments one-by-one in this blog.

Comment of National Society of Professional Engineers:

Let's place ourselves where NSPE has stood on AV issues. NPSE has been troubled by AV legislation in Congress over the past few years. 

This legislation would allow automakers to deploy autonomous vehicles without first properly addressing the major safety, technological, and ethical implications. NSPE is working to ensure that these issues, particularly the need for independent certifications, recognition of the limits of the current technologies, and the ethical considerations in deploying such vehicles, are incorporated into legislation and regulations and considered as part of the next federal review of the guidelines.

What the submitted comment does and does not do

In response to the current ANPRM, NSPE is not calling for development or use of particular technology. We are not talking about LIDAR versus cameras or a combination thereof. Rather NPSE is advocating for ensuring AV safety through diligent implementation of a thorough and ethical process. NPSE's comment directs the reader to its recommendation of uniform AV testing and development procedures and standards that address risk assessment, standards development and implementation, transparency, accountability, and third party verification. 

My translation: If one considers how Tesla has proceeded with its automation software, NPSE seems to be recommending the opposite.

One piece of wisdom: According to one of my close family engineers (and there's a bunch), who works in aerospace, when you study the history of crashes and explosions it is always the same story - a decision to not heed warnings gleaned from routine following of procedures designed to ensure safe operations. 

What NHTSA is requesting - and will the agency receive that?

The ANPRM that NHTSA released is a detailed request for comments, which specifically lists 25 questions. NPSE did not provide a similarly detailed response, but chose to respond with comments about a framework - or really a philosophy - for a solid regulatory process and continued assessment of data as AV technology develops.

Deadline for submitting comments: Feb. 1, 2021